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Paul Burgess 
SHOULD ENTICK V. CARRINGTON BE ON OUR RULE OF LAW RADAR? 
A Review of A. Tomkins & P. Scott (eds.), Entick v. Carrington: 250 Years 
of the Rule of Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015 
he question posed above is ambiguous. It could be asked in 
circumstances where Entick v. Carrington
1
 is already on our 
Rule of Law radar or it could be asked in the opposite 
circumstance: it could relate to whether Entick should be added to our Rule 
of Law radar or, alternatively, whether it should be removed. In the recently 
published book Entick v. Carrington: 250 Years of the Rule of Law
2
 the 
case’s centrality to the Rule of Law is presupposed. Through answering 
both aspects of the question posed, I will ultimately conclude that although 
it may not have been on many Rule of Law radars there may exist sufficient 
justification for its addition.  
I answer the titular question from a position where the case’s 
appearance on my radar is a relatively recent event and in relation to the 
literature and debates associated with the conceptual content of the Rule of 
Law in the specific sense. It is this specific sense of the Rule of Law 
conceptual debates to which I refer in relation to the Rule of Law radar. I 
am aware of the widespread and frequent association of Entick with the 
Rule of Law in the context of constitutional law or public law more 
generally; especially in the UK common law tradition. The perspective 
adopted reflects my familiarity with the Rule of Law specific literature and 
it also reflects my relative ignorance of Entick before reading the book; 
something that may be the result of my being a non-UK trained lawyer. My 
examination of the relevance of the book and the case in relation to the Rule 
of Law specific literature, and from a position of relative non-familiarity 
with the case, will, I hope, provide a point of interest across all of these 
fields and will emphasise (or re-emphasise) the importance of the case and 
the relevance of the book.  
I will take it to be the case that something should be on our Rule of Law 
« radar » if it is an important Rule of Law case. To be an important Rule of 
Law case it must have had an impact on the development of the field. 
Accordingly, an important Rule of Law case must contribute to the 
development of the Rule of Law. Of course, this position requires some 
broad idea of what is meant by “the Rule of Law”. I will, ever so briefly, 
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stipulate what I mean by this in the final paragraph of this section. Then, 
after concluding Entick is capable of being an important Rule of Law case 
and, therefore, there exists justification for its inclusion on our Rule of Law 
radar, I will suggest some reasons why it has not traditionally been so 
included. Although I make reference to the content of the Entick book 
throughout, before concluding I highlight the important role the text may 
play in promoting Entick as a case worthy of inclusion on our Rule of Law 
radar. 
It is useful, before any substantive examination, to sketch the 
background to the case. I can only hope to scratch the surface here; the early 
chapters of the book provide a far more detailed historical and contextual 
exegesis; this includes a substantial amount of background information 
relating to the key figures in the case provided by David Feldman, Tom 
Hickman and Jacob Rowbottom in Chapters 1-3. These chapters set the 
contextual landscape – political, legal and societal – for the case and the 
interrelated series of litigation of which it is a part. The three different 
perspectives from which the authors tackle the same conceptual challenge 
provide – when read together – a nuanced understanding of the case 
together with the people, society and politics of the period. Of particular 
utility in reading the rest of the book is Feldman’s fantastically detailed 
description of the case’s major (and minor) figures. Together, the three 
initial chapters of the book provide a crucial introduction to those not 
familiar with the case or the period; they provide an ideal way to start, and 
to understand, the other chapters in the book. Whilst Entick exists in the 
wider contextual framework outlined in those chapters, it can be described, 
in its most basic terms, as a case relating to the issuance of a search and 
seizure warrant by the Secretary of State. The warrant related to the 
publication of a profoundly anti-government newspaper and resulted in the 
search of and seizure of material from the house of John Entick – who was 
involved in the newspaper’s authoring – by several of the King’s 
messengers. The action was brought in trespass by John Entick against one 
of those messengers: Nathan Carrington. The warrant’s issuance could be 
seen as being for purposes collateral to the allegations of seditious libel on 
which it was based; perhaps for the purposes of intimidation or as a tool of 
delay. In amongst the other aspects of the rich and detailed judicial opinion, 
Lord Camden found that the Secretary of State could not authorise 
otherwise unlawful actions. Even in these basic terms, it will be of no 
surprise that the case can be seen, and is variously argued, to relate to 
various principles that include: the exercise and limits of public power and 
arbitrariness; the necessity of state action; individual and property rights; 
liberty and civil liberties; the freedom of the press; and, of most relevance 
here, the Rule of Law (broadly conceived). These issues and positions are 
addressed, argued and adopted – in different measures, and in different ways 
– by the eight contributors to the book.  
Before going further, I must first address what, exactly, I mean by ‘the 
Rule of Law’. Of course, this is a massive question that cannot be answered 
here; a large portion of the Rule of Law-specific literature relates to the 
contested nature of the concept. To avoid becoming bogged in those debates 
I will, instead, stipulate what I take ‘the Rule of Law’ to mean for the 
purpose of these comments. In doing this, I provide what I hope to be an 
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unobjectionable and broad idea of the Rule of Law that will, despite the 
concept’s contested status, facilitate a common point of reference. 
Accordingly, I will avoid including any highly contestable notions like 
human rights or democracy in this stipulation. I will also avoid adopting any 
particular theorist’s Rule of Law desiderata or a hybrid list of desiderata. 
Instead, I adopt a simple meaning that relates to the potential function of the 
Rule of Law. I will take the Rule of Law to be a concept that relates to the 
control of arbitrary power. This aspect of the Rule of Law can be readily 
identified across canonical conceptions. Furthermore, and relevantly, this 
does not appear to contradict the positions taken by the Entick Book’s 
contributors. The control of arbitrary power seems to be the most 
uncontroversial and frequently cited function of the Rule of Law. In the 
context of this examination, this adopted meaning provides an adequate way 
to (broadly) define potential Rule of Law-relevant material: I will consider 
the case to be relevant to the Rule of Law – and our Rule of Law radar – if it 
relates to the control of the imposition of arbitrary power.  
SHOULD ENTICK BE ON THE RULE OF LAW RADAR? 
It is not denied that Entick is a generally important case. In describing 
the case’s relationship to the law of seditious libel, Tom Hickman seeks to 
associate the case with other great cases. He is not alone. The case is 
variously described by other contributors to the book as being « a great 
case » as well as « a seminal constitutional case
3
 » and it is referred to as 
being a landmark in the opening pages of the chapters by both Denis 
Baranger – outlining how Entick is relevant to liberty in the modern state – 
and Tom Mullen – who considers the impact and effect of Entick on Scots 
law
4
. The question of whether Entick actually is a landmark is specifically 
taken up as the focus of the chapter by Timothy Endicott. As it is couched in 
useful terms, and in my consideration of whether Entick should be 
considered an important Rule of Law case, I largely adopt – and modify 
only slightly – Endicott’s characterisation of a landmark in relation to the 
common law: « A landmark […] is a case that had an important impact on 
the development of the law
5
 ». I merely simplify this idea to one of 
“importance”. Before addressing the question posed in the title of this 
section, and notwithstanding the case’s importance in constitutional or 
public law, a preliminary question must first be answered: Did Entick have 
an important impact on the development of the Rule of Law?  
However, before considering Entick’s potential importance, a more 
basic question must be answered: Is Entick a Rule of Law case? In 
answering this question, the Entick Book is, unsurprisingly, instructive. Not 
only does Endicott’s chapter specifically address the case’s status as a 
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landmark, but Adam Tomkins also explores the nature of the case’s 
authority. Tomkins states Entick is remembered amongst constitutional 
lawyers as being a leading authority on the Rule of Law
6
. His contribution 
focusses on defending the proposition – made by him in an earlier work – 
that in acting the executive must have a legal authority that permits its 
actions. Something of value will be lost, Tomkins suggests, if a proposition 
in these terms is not derived from Entick. This broad reading of the 
authority in Entick contrasts with the narrow reading adopted in the chapters 
by Timothy Endicott and Paul Scott outlined below. It could also be 
contrasted with a view put by Joseph Raz in an earlier work: « If 
government is, by definition, government authorized by law the rule of law 
seems to amount to an empty tautology, not a political ideal
7
 ». Tomkins’s 
broad reading could be seen to be defending the thinner idea of rule by law. 
Yet, in considering the broad idea of the Rule of Law adopted herein, 
Tomkins’s assessment suggests the case is at least capable of being included 
under the Rule of Law umbrella; at least by virtue of the potential for this 
sort of protection to be a part of the Rule of Law.  
Endicott and Scott – much like Jacob Rowbottom – seem to view the 
case, and arguably any idea of the Rule of Law, through a constitutional 
lens; or, at least, through a lens that does not necessarily require adoption of 
a Rule of Law position (in the conceptual debates’ sense). This 
constitutional – and not Rule of Law-specific – focus is clear. Rowbottom’s 
chapter explores the case’s association with the propaganda wars and the 
liberty of the press during the period. It starts by specifically associating 
Entick with the curriculum in constitutional law courses
8
. Endicott’s focus is 
similarly constitutional. He specifically associates the case with the 
development of the law of the constitution and defends a position in which 
public authorities are limited by law, but have powers that are not specified 
by law
9
. Scott seeks to identify the contribution of Entick as being the 
leading case in relation to the right to property. He questions the reading of 
Entick as representing a procedural or formal conception of the Rule of Law 
and suggests a reading in those terms would be very generous
10
. In setting 
this position, and whilst he is sceptical of the benefits of such, Scott clearly 
accepts that Entick occupies a position as a seminal constitutional case
11
. 
What is apparent from these positions – which seem capable of extension to 
the majority of the contributors – is that it is accepted that the case is a 
vitally important constitutional law case; or, in the very least, a generally 
important common law case. Yet, more is required to establish the case’s 
Rule of Law status. To determine this, it is necessary to consider the case in 
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basic terms. Whilst this could be achieved by considering the case alone, I 
will do so by examining some of the issues specifically raised and explored 
by the book’s contributors.  
In considering the Rule of Law as relating to the prevention of the 
exercise of arbitrary power, the very nature of the case – as the assumption 
of a wide search and seizure power and its exercise, potentially for collateral 
purposes, against an individual critical of the government – seems to 
suggest a relation to this idea of the Rule of Law. But, again, more is 
required. A conclusion as to the importance of the case must properly rest 
on the nature of the opinion and the principles for which it stands. In this 
respect, what is most clear from the Entick Book is that the case can stand 
for many, many, things. Each of the authors derive a – sometimes subtly, 
sometimes substantially – different meaning from the case. Endicott, for 
example, sees the opinion as relating to Lord Camden’s « most deliberate 
effort at accounting for public power and its limits
12
 ». Notwithstanding 
Paul Scott’s scepticism regarding viewing the case in terms of bare legality 
associated only with public law, the questions raised as to whether public 
bodies need authority or justification for certain actions – as addressed in 
some detail in Tomkins’s chapter – appear capable of fitting within the 
broad Rule of Law meaning adopted. This is also borne out in Baranger’s 
characterisation of the test applied in the case as being a formal one: was 
there an authorisation on the books for an exercise of power
13
? It is clear 
that arbitrariness is, amongst the many aspects of the case, one of the more 
constant and obvious aspects derived by the book’s contributors. On the 
basis of this brief examination, notwithstanding the various different 
conceptions of the Rule of Law that are evident in the book – something 
which is unsurprising given the nature and contest associated with the 
concept – it is clear that, on the idea of the Rule of Law adopted herein, 
Entick can be seen as a Rule of Law case; or, in the very least, a case in 
which the Rule of Law has some relevance.  
We can now consider whether Entick has had an important impact on 
the development of the Rule of Law. An obvious place to start – and one 
that is alluded to in several chapters – is the specific reference to Entick in 
Dicey’s Rule of Law formulation. Dicey provides a single bare reference to 
Entick as authority for the proposition that « a secretary of state […] and all 
subordinates, though carrying out the commands of their official superiors, 
are as responsible for any act which the law does not authorise as is any 
private and unofficial person
14
 ». This proposition is included in relation to 
Dicey’s second principle of the Rule of Law; the idea of legal equality:  
We mean in the second place, when we speak of the « rule of law» as a 
characteristic of our country, not only that with us no man is above the law, 
but (what is a different thing) that here every man, whatever be his rank or 
 
12
 Ibid., p. 109. 
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condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals
15
. 
Tomkins is correct when he suggests Dicey’s bare reference to Entick 
operates as « an illustration of a principle rather than as authority for 
anything grander
16
 ». Although in the first Dicey extract above I have 
specifically focussed on « a secretary of state », Dicey also lists other 
positions of power that include a governor and a military officer. He 
provides specific citations for each
17
. An alternative case example could 
have been located as being an authority for the fact that the law applied 
equally to the Secretary of State
18
. Nevertheless, it is apparent that, at least 
in some small sense, Dicey considered Entick the most appropriate or 
relevant authority to cite. The selection of Entick particularly suggests the 
case was important in some respect to Dicey and his conception of the Rule 
of Law; hence, it was important in the development of his conception of the 
Rule of Law. Interestingly, Dicey does not specifically associate Entick with 
the exercise of arbitrary power. Arbitrary power is outlined as his first 
principle
19. Several chapters of the book refer to and discuss Dicey’s direct 
citation of the case in relation to legal equality – Dicey’s second principle of 
the Rule of Law. Notwithstanding the absence of any direct citation by 
Dicey, Rowbottom – in his consideration of press freedom – suggests the 
principle in Entick is reflected in Dicey’s first principle: as a view of the 
Rule of Law as the absence of arbitrary power
20
. As a consequence of the 
meaning of the Rule of Law adopted herein, I agree with Rowbottom. The 
expansive idea of the Rule of Law as preventing the exercise of arbitrary 
power can follow from the prophylactic effect of the principle of legal 
equality. On this basis, Entick is capable of reflecting Dicey’s first principle 
despite any specific or explicit allusion or connection made by Dicey 
between the case and that principle.  
We can, at least, say Dicey was aware of the case and it was in his mind 
when formulating his Rule of Law ideas. Of course, this suggests only an 
impact on Dicey’s conception of the Rule of Law; it does not determine 
whether, specifically at least, Entick has had an impact on the development 
of the concept of the Rule of Law. It can be said that, whilst Dicey’s 
conception of the Rule of Law has been criticized, his conception has, 
 
15
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nevertheless, been influential in some sense in the development of the field 
of study associated with the Rule of Law; if nothing else, Dicey is 
frequently cited as being responsible for the popularization of the phrase the 
Rule of Law. Furthermore, the general principles he described regarding the 
prevention of arbitrary exercise of power and the application of the law to 
all equally remain recognizable Rule of Law ideas in almost any popular 
conception
21
. In this sense, there is some justification for suggesting Entick 
has, at least, indirectly impacted the development of the Rule of Law. 
Detailed assessment of the relative importance of Entick and Dicey’s 
conception of the Rule of Law generally would be a fascinating process, but 
it is one that cannot sensibly or practically be undertaken here. For this 
reason, I will, sadly, have to be content with a non-definitive answer to the 
question: Did Entick have an important impact on the development of the 
Rule of Law? The answer is an equivocal “Maybe”. As, although Entick has 
the potential of some – conceivably important – impact on the development 
of the Rule of Law, in answering the question posed in the title to this 
section, we cannot say definitively that Entick should be in important Rule 
of Law case and, hence, be included on the Rule of Law radar.  
My comments in the opening paragraphs of this note suggest that Entick 
did not previously occupy a position on my Rule of Law radar. But has it 
been included on others’ Rule of Law radars? Throughout the Entick Book, 
and as referred to above, there is reference to Entick being a key case in 
relation to constitutional law. I do not seek to challenge that position. But 
what of the more narrowly conceived Rule of Law literature? In the space 
afforded it is not possible conduct any detailed consideration of that entire 
literature. Instead, by way of a very broad based test, I have attempted to 
identify Entick in three different Rule of Law texts from three different 
countries with three different points of view. The texts are those by Brian 
Tamanaha, Chris May and Jørgen Møller
22
. In taking this approach, I 
augment a similar review conducted by Tomkins in his chapter
23
. Whilst 
Tamanaha’s book is now over a decade old, this widely cited work provides 
six chapters detailing conceptions of the Rule of Law from Ancient Greece 
through to modern day. The texts by May and Møller, both published in 
2014, include detailed backgrounds and introductions regarding the nature 
and definition of the Rule of Law as a concept. There is no mention of 
 
21
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Entick across the three texts
24
. Whilst Dicey is frequently referred to and 
cited, a brief review suggests a general absence of specific reference to 
Entick across a variety of further secondary sources
25
 as well as in canonical 
conceptions of the Rule of Law
26
. In the course of this – all too – brief 
examination, only one mention was located in relation to a historical 
examination of the Rule of Law
27
. This suggests that, even if Entick is 
known to authors engaged in the Rule of Law specific literature, the case 
itself does not occupy a position sufficient to show up on their radars
28
.  
The relative absence of reference to Entick could be seen as not 
especially surprising. Cases are not frequently cited in relation to the 
conceptual debates associated with the Rule of Law
29
. Notwithstanding this, 
in circumstances where Entick has the potential to be a radar-worthy case, 
and where it was decided at a time where the operation of Rule of Law ideas 
– particularly across the Atlantic – were a key concern, we could consider 
why Entick has been largely forgotten, or overlooked, in relation to the Rule 
of Law. Perhaps it is the single bare citation of the case (without further 
elaboration or detail) by Dicey
30
? Perhaps it is his association of Entick with 
his principle of legal equality and not with his idea of arbitrariness? Or, 
perhaps it is the large number of, often conflicting, propositions or positions 
that could be derived from Entick itself? Each of these appear to be viable 
potential reasons available from the above discussion, the case and the 
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Entick Book. One further potential reason, and the one that I favour
31
, flows 
from a further point that is raised in the book: Entick gained little notoriety 
before, and seems only to become a “great case” in, the 20th century. This 
point is made by Tom Mullen in relation to Entick’s impact in Scots Law, as 
well as by Adam Tomkins and Timothy Endicott
32
. So it seems conceivable 
that – whilst no definitive work exists in relation to a statement of the Rule 
of Law, and the concept remains highly contested and contestable – Entick 
may have missed the conceptual boat by virtue of its delayed popularity. By 
the time the case gains notoriety, not only had the Rule of Law debate 
changed to reflect (in some instances) ideas associated with broader or 
thicker conceptions, the key thinkers in the Rule of Law tradition may have 
already formed their ideas without having previously had specific recourse 
to Entick in the context of the Rule of Law.  
HAS THE ENTICK BOOK PLACED ENTICK ON THE RULE OF LAW RADAR?  
Entick is established as a well know case in relation to the study of the 
law of the constitution – at least in relation to the English constitution and, 
arguably, in relation to some aspects of the US Constitution
33
. It is also clear 
that there has been little attention given to Entick in the specific literature on 
the Rule of Law. In this context it is, in some respects, unfair to the book 
and its contributors to pose the question in this section’s title. After all, it is 
palpably clear that the book did not set out to place Entick on our Rule of 
Law radar. Instead, the intent was to reflect on the potential disagreements 
that exist in relation to the interpretation of the case and to explore how the 
case manifests the ideal of the Rule of Law. In this respect, the book 
undoubtedly succeeds. The work, as a collection of different authors’ 
positions regarding the context, impact and meaning of the decision, suits 
this purpose well. Further, even where the authors do not disagree and they 
cover the same or similar issues across various chapters, the account does 
not become repetitive or stale; even in taking broadly comparable positions 
or in describing similar events, the authors’ contributions enhance, rather 
than detract from, the content. The various individual authors’ positions 
shine through in terms that allow, and embrace, contradiction and 
disagreement. By presenting the authors’ views in this way, the essence of 
the debates regarding the meaning and authority of Entick is evident and 
operates to promote the importance and relevance of the decision.  
In terms where it is clear that the Entick Book has achieved its aim, the 
question heading this section is posed to explore whether the book can 
achieve more. After all, it has certainly placed Entick on my Rule of Law 
radar. My increased appreciation of the case, and the context in which it was 
 
31
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decided, has informed my understanding of Rule of Law ideas not only in a 
period that was vital to issues associated with the control of arbitrary power 
(especially in relation to what is now the United States) but also in 
contextualising a period that lies at the mid-way point between important 
Rule of Law ideas associated with Hobbes and with Dicey. For anyone with 
an interest in Rule of Law ideas, the addition – or even heightened 
prevalence – of Entick on the Rule of Law radar that follows from a review 
of the book is of real benefit. Although the Entick Book did not set out to do 
so, I have no doubt that there will be others whose Rule of Law radar will be 
augmented as a result of this work.  
Paul Burgess is a PhD Candidate at the University of Edinburgh. 
